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Migration as a Socio-Po1itica1 Phenomenon
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
I. Introduction
One of the most perplexing policy dilemmas confronting the communities
along the Mexico - United States border has always been the migration of
people. The archipe1igo of geographically isolated communities that are
scattered along both sides of the international border have long had to
bear the brunt of the historic unwillingness of their respective govern-
ments to address the migration issue. Manyof the communities along the
United States side have long been among the most impoverished of the
'.\'''''''
nation. Low levels of income., high levels of unemployment, low labor
force participation rates (especially among women), high dropout rates
from schools, and a pervasive pattern of low wages across a wide range of
diverse occupations are all the obvious signs of extreme labor surplus.
On the Mexican side, the populations of their border communities have
dramatically increased in size since the end of World War II. These
population increases have far outstripped the capacity of their local
communities to provide the necessary social services and housing for
their citizens. The Mexican border communities have the identical labor
market characteristics as the American border communities except that
their magnitude is far worse. They too bear the burden of having ex-
tremely surplus labor markets.
Undoubtedly, the prospect of finding employment in the United States--
either legally or i1legally--is part of the explanation for the dramatic
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population increases ofithe Mexican communities. These communities have
become staging areas for hundreds of thousands of persons each year who
seek the.opportunity to cross the border. They are also places where
families can be left until the breadwinner for the family can fifid a
job and arrange for them to join him or where they often await his re-
tu rn . There is, however, an important difference between the Mexican
border communities and those of the United States. Whereas the communi-
ties along the United States side of the border collectively represent
one of the most economically depressed regions of the nation, the reverse
is true of the status of the Mexican border communities. For aside from
the Federal District of Mexico City, the northern border states of Mexico
have the highest income levels to be found in Mexico. Thus, given far
more chronic needs elsewhere, the border communities and their massive
problems have seldom been a high priority concern of the Mexican govern-
ment.
The usual analysis of the migration of people from one country to
another is based largely upon an elaboration of the relevant economic
forces. 1 The mass migration of people from Mexico to the United States
began during the second decade of the Twentieth Century. Since then, with
the exception of the period from 1930 to the mid-1940s, the migration has
continued almost unabated. Masses of people leave the familiarity of
their homeland and go to an unknown land.Q.!2l.t if both "push" and "pull"
pressures are simultaneously operative. In most instances, the "push"
factors from Mexico derive momentumfrom the interrelated economic
, issues of over-population, massive poverty, and high unemployment. Of
increasing significance are the pervasive structural changes that are
3occurring within the economy of Mexico. These changes stem from the
introduction of capital intensive technology as well as continuation of
rural to urban migration. Likewise, there are the strong economic "pull"
factors that emanate from the United States. The relatively higher wages
and broader array of available job opportunities of the American economy
function as a powerful humanmagnet.
But in addition to these familiar economic issues, there are also
key socio-political factors that are involved. These considerations are
more subtle and, to date, they have generally been ignored in most dis-
cuss ions of Mexican immigration. Yet, in many ways they have been more
important than the economic factors in the formulation of the coalitions
in the United States both for and against reform of the nation's immigra-
tion system. They are also, in all probability, a major explanation as
to why the government of Mexico is totally unwi.lling to do anything about
the outflow of its people.
II. The Broad Context of the Migration Issue
There are few factors that have been more important to the develop-
ment of the population and the labor force of the United States than
inmigration. The descriptive phrase "a nation of inmigrants" is no mere
cliche. It correctly portrays both the magnitude of the sheer numbers of
people who have come and are still coming to the United States as well as
the vital qualitative characteristics of their skill contributions toward
the building of the nation.
Indeed, no subject more fundamentally touches the essence of the
American experience than inmigration. A heterogenous people in quest of
a homogeneous national identity has been the history of the United States.
4In its evolving and often controversial role immigration policy has
served as a foundation stone for numerous components of pUblic policy.
As a socio-political phenomenon, it has been instrumentally involved in
such diverse areas of public concern as human resource policy, foreign
policy, labor policy, agricultural policy, and race policy. Due to its
multiple purposes and complex nature, immigration has been and, perhaps,
always will be a subject of much controversy.
Although the concern of this paper pertains largely to immigration
issues between Mexico and the United States, the broader dimension of the
topic of immigration cannot be forgotten. In 1979, approximately 600,000
persons were legally admitted to the United States as immigrants and
refugees. They came from virtually every nation in the world. During
the same year, the number of people who illegally immigrated into the
United States was, in all probability, far in excess of the number of the
legally admitted. No one, of course, knows the precise number of illegal
immigrants in either the annual flow or the accumulated stock of those
who currently reside in the United States. The fact that the number of
apprehended illegal immigrants has escal~ted from 70,684 in 1960 to
1,047,687 in 1978 with virtually no increase in deterrant or apprehension
capability over the same time interval does strongly suggest that illegal
immigration is no myth. Of course, the apprehension figures contain an
extensive amount of multiple counting (i.e., the same people apprehended
more than once). Most illegal immigrants who are apprehended (about 90
percent) are persons from Mexico. Typically, they enter the United States
. without documentation.
But in addition to these persons, there are also those persons who
5enter the United States with proper documents (e.g., students, crewmen,
businessmen, tourists, and visitors) who simply do not leave when their
expiration dates occur. Most of these "visa abusers" are believed to be
non-Mexican. At least 60 nations are believed to be regular sources of
significant numbers of illegal immigrants to the United States.2 But no
matter whether they had documents or not, most of those who enter or
who overstay their visits to the United States illegally are not appre-
hended. Undoubtedly, some of these persons enter or overstay for only
short periods of time. This is especially the case with some of those
who come from Mexico. The vast remainder survive and assimilate as best
they can given their perilous status.
It is logical to assume that, if the flow is large and if it is in.
creasing, the stock must also be annually increasing in aggregate size
even if not proportionately to the growth in the size of the flow.
Estimates of the stock of illegal immigrants from academic studies and
government reports range anywhere from 3 to 12 million persons. The
general consensus places the figure between 6 to 8 million persons with
the majority being from Mexico. But it i.s not necessary to know the exact
number or to even try to es t imate its size if it is conceded tha t the
stock is substantial in size and that the direction of the annual change
is toward increasing numbers.
Illegal immigration is a real issue for the United States and it is
likely that it will only increase in its severity as a problem in the
1980's. The issue for the United States is far greater than simply the
. illegal immigrants from Mexico. Because of the long common border, any
efforts to find a solution to the problem will undoubtedly cause extreme
{)
stress in international relations between Mexico and the United States.
But the most ironic twist of all is that whether the United States does
or does not reform its immigration policies, the border communities of
both nations will continue to be adversely affected by immigration
problems. This is a harsh reality.
III. Socio Political Forces Pressing for Immigration Reform in the
United States
Although illegal immigration to the United States has existed as
an issue since entry restrictions were first imposed in the 1920s, it
has become politically important only since the 1960s. It is critical
to understand the series of separate socio-political events that were
seemingly unrelated to immigration but which, collectively, occurred in
the 1960s. For they have provided the basis for its formulation of the
coalitions whose efforts resulted in the comprehensive immigration re-
form proposals put forth by the Carter Administration in 1977.
A. The Anti-Discrimination Movement
The first factor was the civil rights movement. Beginning in earnest
in the late 1950s, the nations black population began its drive to end the
legacy of denial of equal opportunity in the United States. The thrust
of this phase of the civil rights movementwas centered in the southeastern
states and it was primarily directed at social (e.g., equal access to
public facilities) and political (e.g., barriers to registering and exer-
cising the right to vote) forms of overt discrimination. The drive cul-
. minated in the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. By the end of the
1960s, the Act had been extremely successful in its efforts to overcome
'.7
these social and political barriers. Overt discrimination rapidly dis-
appeared as a significant issue. But, at the same time, it was soon
apparent that equal opportunity was far from a reality. By the 1ate
1960s and throughout the entire decade, the attention of the civil
rights movement shifted to the vital area of economics (i.e., jobs and
income). As the Rev. Jesse Jackson has said, the IIcivil rights movement II
has become the IIs i 1ver ri ghts II movement. Likewise, the scope of atten-
tion shifted from the overt practices of the South to the covert prac-
tices that existed in every regional sector of the nation against blacks.3
Covert practices mean the restrictive practices that are built into the
nations institutions (i.e., government agencies, unions, schools, and
business firms) that cause essentially the same denial of opportunity
to occur as if overt practices continued to prevail.
For present purposes, the relationship of the civil rights movement
to the topic of immigration evolved from the fact that it was not long
before other minority groups in the United States also sought to achieve
equal opportunity to American life. For present purposes, reference must
be made to Americans of Mexican origin. ~exican Americans, who are in-
creasingly referred to as Chicanos, also had a history of discriminatory
treatment.4 Although not as pervasive as the historical discrimination
against blacks, the impact upon Chicanos has been equally as insidious in
its effective results. The denial of equal economic opportunity to
Chicanos was especially the result of forms of institutional racism.
The best nationally known leader to emerge from the Chicano movement
in the mid-1960s.
Chavez began his epic struggle to organize farmworkers
But his organization, the United Farm Workers (U.F.W.)
. is Cesar Chavez.
8was more than simply a typical bread-and-butter oriented American trade
union. It has always had the character of a broad social movement as
well. Chavez came to the farm worker movement from a background as a
community organizer. His organizing efforts in California wer~, in
many ways. far more encompassing than merely establishing a union. He
sought to awaken the collective consciousness of local Chicanos. In
fact, it is likely that the major reason why many California growers
were willing to sign labor contracts with the powerful Teamsters Union
but not with the weak United Farm Workers was precisely because the
growers feared that Chavez and his followers had local goals that were
more ambitious than simply gaining representation rights.
From the outset of their efforts to organize farm workers, the U.F.W.
encountered the fact that growers had access to illegal immigrants from
Mexico as a constant source of strikebreakers. As one descriptive article
noted:
The U.F.W. was also made vulnerable by the Mexican
border which provides a natural cornucopia of
docile, cheap laborers who unknowingly become
strikebreakers eagerly hired by American growers
and accepted by labor contractors and the Team-
sters. Few Americans call them 'wetbacks' now.
They are simply the 'illegals' Any effective
strike, then, is virtually prohibited by what one
U.F.W. official calls that huge, phantgm 'flow'
of illegals into American farm fields.
Throughout the 1970s Chavez made constant note of the difficulties that
illegal immigrants caused his struggle for a farmworker's union and for
social justice for the people of their communities.6
The adverse impact of uncontrolled illegal immigration upon the job
and income opportunities of Chicanos was not restricted to simply the
U.F.W. The institutional practices of the immigration system--its lack
9sanctions against employers; its reliance upon voluntary departures for
almost everyone who is apprehended; and the chronically underfunded and
understaffed Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) who have en~
forcement responsibilities for the nation's immigration system ~~
guarantee that the occupations and industries in the geographic areas
where Chicanos are most numerous are also those where most illegal
immigrants from Mexico are to be found.7
B. The Anti-Poverty Movement
Paralleling the evolution of the civil rights movement was the begin-
ning of the "war on poverty in 1964." Aside from the specific programs
of the Johnson Administration and of subsequent administrations, the im-
portance of these efforts were that the focused attention on the causes
of poverty not its mere existence per see Historically, anti~poverty
programs in the United States had been based on the principle of sub~
sidfzing the poor. The Johnson programs in particular sought to accomplish
the more difficult task of trying to prevent poverty rather than merely
reacting to its consequences.
In this regard, the border policies of the United States -~ not just
the toleration of massive numbers of illegal immigrants"but also policies
with respect to commuting workers (i.e., Ilgreen carders ") and "touri st"
workers (i.e., "white carders" who are not supposed to work but often do)
were found to be a classic example of institutionalized poverty. In the
Southwest, these governmental policies collectively enabled poor Mexicans
to makeand to keep Chi canos poor.8 They have hi stori cally been used to
keep the labor market all along the border in a constant state of surplus.
As such, it can be argued that there has been a conscientious effort to
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keep wages low, to keep incomes depressed, and to keep unions out.
efforts have been extremely successful.
These
The three poorest metropolitan areas in the nation (Brownsville,
McAllen, and El Paso) are located along the Rio Grande in Texas.. Among
the poorest rural counties in the United States are many in the Southwest,
Unionism in the Southwest is hardly known outside of California, and even
there it has had its organizational problems due to the availability of
hordes of willing strikebreakers. The effect of past border policies in
the Southwest has been to create a labor surplus throughout the region
but especially along the border.
It should be understood that the contention is not that immigration
policy is the cause of widespread Chicano impoverishment but, rather,
that it is a cause. Thus, for those persons seriously concerned about the
casuses of poverty in general and about Chicano economic welfare in par-
ticular, reform of the nation's immigration policy became a prime concern.
In addition to Chicanos, the same argument can be made with respect
to other groups who are struggling to improve their economic position.
In many local labor markets both inside and outside the Southwest,
illegal immigrants from Mexico and other nations compete for the same
jobs as do individiuals from other groups in the United States. There is
not a single occupation in the low wage labor market (sometimes called the
secondary labor market by contemporary labor economists) in which the
majority of workers currently working are not U.S. citizens. But these
low wage occupations are where many blacks, youths, women, and Hispanic
. workers (i.e., Chicanos and Puerto Ricans especially but also some Cubans)
are disproportionately concentrated. The IIcrowding-inll effect of illegal
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immigrants into these same occupations can only be detrimental to the
emerging public concern in the United States to assist these specific
target groups. Obviously, the pres:enceof illegal immigrants in these
same labor markets works counter to the entire thrust of national poliCY
measures to improve the employment and income opportunities of these
sub groups of the population. Black civil rights groups as well as
organizations of other ethnic groups have long been privately critical of
prevailing immigration policies. They know that blacks are severely
affected by illegal immigration in the competition for entry level jobs.
The April, 1979 issue of the popular black magazine Ebony, with its
article entitled "Illegal Aliens: Big Threat to Black Workers," is
clearly a sign of their growing awareness of the nature of the issue.
Immigration reform is not merely a Chicano issue or a Mexican issue or a
border issue or a regional issue. It is increasingly a national and
international issue both in scope and impact.
C. The Termination of the Bracero Program
Coming into the 1960's, there existed a program in the Southwest
that was a perfect example of exactly how foreign workers could be used
to manipulate a labor market to the detriment of the economic interests
of citizen workers. It had been introduced during World War II when
growers in the Southwest contended that there was a shortage of agricul-
tura 1 workers. They were successful in their lobbying efforts to con-
vince policymakers in Washington that the problem was real. Fo 11 owi ng
direct negotiations between the governments of both Mexico and the
United States, the Mexican Labor Program was launched in 1942. It was
more commonly known as the" bracero" prog ram. Under its auspices,
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Mexican workers were afforded numerous safeguards with respect to housing,
transportation, food, medical needs, and wage rates. Initiated through
the appropriations bill for Public Law 45, the program was extended by
subsequent enactment until 1947. For the growers the bracero program
proved to be a bonanza.9 Braceros were limited exclusively to agri-
cultural work. Any bracero who was found holding a job in any other
industry was subject to immediate deportation. When the agreement ended
on December 31, 1947, the program was continued informally and unregulated
until 1951. In that year, under the guise of another war-related labor
shortage, it was revived by Public Law 78.
Parelleling the bracero years and following its termination in 1964
has been the accelerated growth in the number of illegal Mexicans. Many
of these illegal aliens were former braceros. They had been attracted
to the Mexican border towns from the rural interior of central and
northern Mexico by the existence of the contract labor program. To this
degree, there is some truth to the proposition that the United States it-
self has created the illegal alien problem. By the same token, however,
it is simplistic to conclude that the problem would not eventually have
surfaced in the absence of the bracero program due to the existence of the
vast economic differences between the two national economies.
The bracero program demonstrated precisely how border policies can
adversely affect citizen workers in the United States -- especially, in
this case, the Chicanos who composed the bulk of the southwestern agri-
cultural labor force. At its peak, almost one-half million braceros
~ere working in the agricultural labor market of the Southwest. The
availability of Mexican workers significantly depressed existing wage
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levels; modulated wage increases that would have occurred in its absence;
and compressed the duration of time in which many rural citizen workers
could be employed. Citizen farmworkers simply could not compete with
braceros.10 The bracero program was a significant factor in the rapid
exodus of rural Chicanos to urban labor markets between 1950 and 1970.
There they were poorly prepared to find employment and housing.ll The
fact that braceros were captive workers who were totally subject to the
unilateral demands of employers made them especially appealing to many
employers. It is this same element -- of total dependence -- in the
post-bracero era that has also made illegal immigrants so attractive to
emp1oyers. But now without even the minimal protections that were once
required for braceros, illegal immigrants are potentially subject to greater
exploitation and abuse. The illegal character of their presence means
that this :is virtually no realistic way in which the federal government
.of the United States can either protect or defend them.
As a result of widespread dissatisfaction by policymakers during the
civil rights and anti-poverty era of the mid-1960's, the bracero program
was unilaterally terminated by the United States on December 31, 1964.
D. The Immigration Act of 1965
Although unrecognized at the time, one of the most significant
legislative accomplishments of the administration of President Lyndon
Johnson was the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. Passed at the
height of the civil rights movement, its most important feature was that
it abolished the racial quotas that were the essential characteristic of
the immigration system up until that time. In addition, the Act of 1965
also significantly increased the total number of immigrants annually
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admitted to the United States. From the time that the Immigration Act of
1924 first imposed aggregate numerical restrictions until the refonm of
1965, legal immigration to the United States averaged about 190,000
persons a year. After its enactment, the annual average doubled to
about 400,000 a year through 1976. Since then, the annual average has
been steadily increasing to a level of about 600,000 immigrants in 1979.
From 1966 until 1976, legal immigrants from Mexico soared--exceeding
70,000 persons a year in the early 1970s. Unfortunately, amendments
to the Act in 1976 put Mexico under the identical 20,000 persons ceiling
that applies to all other nations. Although the amendment appears fair
on its surface, it has undoubtedly increased the pressures for illegal
immigration. It was a counterproductive step that should be repealed
with a figure in the range of the early 1970 immigration levels (i.e.,
50,000 to 70,000 persons) set in its place.
The fact that the number of legal immigrants has increased dramatically
since 1965 has drawn attention to the whole issue of immigration. This is
because legal immigrants have tended to concentrate in several states--
California, NewYork, Texas, and Florida. in particular.12 Moreover,
legal immigrants have also concentrated themselves in tha urban areas of
these states. Because they have been concentrated rather than dispersed,
the accommodation process has often been difficult. Ironically, it is
exactly these same states and urban labor markets that have also been the
destination of the majority of the illegal immigrants. Thus, the sheer
number of immigrants--both legal and illegal--has been partly responsible
for the increased public attention given to the topic. Immigration is
now a major component of the annual growth of the labor force. A
,._~----
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conservative estimate would say that about 25 percent of the annual
growth in the labor force is now coming from both types of immigrants. In
specific localities, of course, this figure could be much higher. With the
birth rate of the population declining, it is certain that irrmigration ~ill
become an even larger component of the annual labor force increase in the
future.
IV. Socio-Political Factor Opposing Immigration Reform
Opposition to proposals to develop an enforceable immigration policy
for the United States can only be explained in terms of socio-political
terms. In this context, an unholy alliance has developed that requires
careful analysis.
As would be expected, a substantial part of the opposition comes
from employers in the Southwest. For many of them, Mexico has alwqys been
a source of cheap and docile labor. Whether it be illegal irrmigrants,
commuters, "tourist" workers, or braceros, the immigration policies of
the United States have seen to it that a supply of workers for unskilled
and semi-skilled work has always been available. During the Nineteenth
Century, it was China and Japan that were' tapped to meet their labor
needs. In the Twentieth Century it has been Mexico.
As every economist knows, it is impossible to separate the employment
effects from the wage effects whenever there is a change in the supply of
labor.13 Hence, the presence of Mexican workers not only affects job
opportunities but it also affects wage levels. It is the wage effects
that are part of the attractiveness of Mexican workers to American em-
ployers. These employers are able to obtain workers at less cost than
would be the case in their absence. This does not mean that most employers
16
exploit these workers by paying wages below the federal minimumwage.
Obviously, some malevolent employers do pay lower than legal wages but
this is clearly the exception in the present era. Available research.
shows that most illegal immigrants do receive at least the federal
minimumwage and many receive much more.14 Most of the exploitation
that occurs is simply the fact workers are available at wage rates that
are lower than would be the case if the same employers had to hire only
citizen workers. But the real case for exploitation is derived from the
fact that an illegal immigrant is likely to be a docile worker. Citizen
workers know that they have job entitlements. These entitlements include
minimumwage protection but extend into a number of other areas such as
overtime pay provisions, safety requirements, equal employment opportunity
protection, and collective bargaining rights. It is these additional em-
ployee entitlements that an employer can often escape if illegal immi-
grants are hired. Thus, even if the wage rates that an employer must pay
are identical for illegal immigrants and for citizen workers, the illegal
immigrant will be preferred. It is the knowledge that illegal immigrants
are less likely to make demands for job r~ghts or to join unions that
makes them preferred workers. If, by chance, the ille~al immigrants do
not act in the expected way, they can immediately be gotten rid of by a
mere call to the I.N.S. Thus, it is the non-economic factors that provide
the crucial advantages for employers.
But in addition to employers, the next most important obstacle to
immigration reform has come from some powerful local leaders in the
. Chicano movement. Frankly stated, the position of these Chicano leaders--
who tend to be intellectuals and militant activists--is purely political.
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It is also purely racist. Some of these leaders base their position on
the fact that the Southwest once belonged to Mexico before being taken
away by an imperialistic war in 1845 - 1848. They call the area "occupied
America" and they espouse an intellectual kinship with Mexico that
transcends any such ties to their fellow American citizens.15 But aside
from this element, there are a significant number of other Chicano leaders
who fervently believe that in politics it is numbers of people who coun~.
Illegal immigration is seen as a way of increasing the eventual size of
the Chicano community in the long run and as a means of i ncreas i ng thei r
collective political strength in the short run. Hence, they simply
dismiss the economic arguments. Illegal immigrants, of course, cannot
vote. But these groups hope to use their numbers as a way to derive
benefit from political reapportionments and as a way to receive increas-
ing federal funds for social programs that are often allocated on the basis
of the numbers of unemployed persons and the number of economically dis-
advantaged persons in a community.16Often when other Chicano leaders
take note of the adverse economic impact, they are visciously attacked
as "turncoats" from their ethnic brothers. The massive and unfair
criticisms leveled at Leonel Castillo, the first Chicano to be appointed
as Conmissioner of I.N.S., for merely trying to do his required duties is
a case in point. It eventually led to his resignation in mid-1979.
These Chicano leaders who oppose immigration reforms, however, are
usually not interested in imnigration in general. They are only con-
cerned with immigration from Mexico. In a number of southwestern com-
munities--such as Denver, Corpus Christi, and Brownsville--there has been
open hostility to government efforts to settle Vietnamese refugees in
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their communities. Why? Because the refugees take jobs and use com-
munity services. Some of these same Chicano leaders have candidly
called for an "open border" with Mexico. They make no such request
for an open Canadian border and they make it clear that they are. only
interested in extending this privilege to Mexicans and no one else.
A recent proponent of this view is the highest ranking Chicano in the
state government of California. He is Mario Obledo, Secretary of Health
and Welfare. He argues that there should be unlimited immigration from
Mexico but that the traditional border checks on entry would have to be
retained to keep all others out since "we have every right to put re-
strictions on entry by people from other countries. 1117
There are, of course, other groups who have also found socio-
political reasons to oppose immigration reforms. One of these has been
the American Civil Liberties Union (ALCU)who oppose any effort to es-
tablish any form of identification which might be used to distinguish
citizens from non-citizens. Without some clearly established identifica-
tion procedure, no employer sanctions can ever by realistically imposed
against hiring illegal aliens. The ACLUfears that any such identifica-
tion could be misused as an instrument of citizen control as has happened
.in Nazi Germanyand in South Africa. Many Chicanos legitimately fear
that, without a universal identification requirement, an employers sanc-
tions law could be used to discriminate against them. They argue that
employers, fearing possible violation of the law, would simply refuse to
hi re anyone with Hispanic features.
Thus, a strange alliance of opposition to immigration reform has
congealed. Powerful employer groups who have traditionally fought every
19
type of social legislation that would benefit the Chicano community now
find their strongest support for doing nothing about immigration coming
from many quarters of the Chicano community.
now blessed by the actions of the A.C.L.U.
In addition, this union is
With this type of opposition, it is not surprising that few politi-
cians have been willing to touch the issue. As a result, President
Carter's comprehensive reform package which was proposed in August 1977
has yet to be acted upon by either house of Congress.
V. Socio Political Factors in Mexico that Affect Migration
In 1975, President Luis Echeverria of Mexico in his Fifth State of
the Nation Report emphatically stated the intention of Mexico to solve the
prob 1em of ill ega 1 migrati on. In his speech he said:
The painful problem of farm workers who cross
the northern border in search of employment because
of the lack of opportunities in the rural areas of
Mexico persists Fundamentally, this phenomenon
like many others faced by our country, is the re-
sult of the neglect of rural areas. As we have
stated before, we are determined to correct this
situation as an essential part of this Administra-
tion.
The solution to the migrant farm worker problem
is dependent upon our own efforts. Farm workers
must have access to a decent life in their oWn
country. As we achieve this, the lure of immigra-
tion will diminish.18
Despite the noble intentions expressed in his address, it is unrealistic
to expect Mexico to solve the migration process itself even if it were
to try. Obviously, in the years that have followed, there has not been
any sign that the migration from Mexico has abated or that Mexico has
done anything to address the issue.
Conceptually, there is no doubt that Mexico would like to stop the
outflow of its citizens to the United States. It is a national
20
embarrassment for any nation to have so many of its citizens constantly
leave in pursuit of better economic opportunities in another nation.
But, realistically, the outflow of migrants coupled with the return of
a considerable amount of foreign exchange earned abroad is a great
leaders of Mexico.
It is especially beneficial to the political
For without the outflow of a considerable portion of
benefit to Mexico.
~ its surplus labor and population, it would have the impossible task of
trying to provide jobs and some measure of community services for these
persons. In the absence of the "safety-valve" of the border, domestic
pressures for drastic reforms could be more acute than they already are
in Mexico. Given the grossly uneven income distribution in Mexico and
the fact that the political system of Mexico is essentially a one party
system, the powerful ruling elite have a strong stake in the perpetuation
of the status quo.19 Without the mass out-migration, there would un-
doubtedly be greater pressure for domestic economic reforms. Hence, it
is likely that those few people in control of Mexico's political machinery
will continue to talk about the issue but, in fact, they will do ab-
solutely nothing to stop it.
The only thing that the government of Mexico can be expected to do
is to become increasingly vocal on its insistence that the human rights
of its citizens who live and work in the United States be protected.
Mexico has had a long tradition of manifesting such concerns.20 In
President Echeverria's aforementioned speech, he reiterated this policy
by sayi ng:
We insist upon the defense of the human and labor
rights of those who work in foreign countries....
Even though they carryon an illegal activity in
21
the territory of another state, they should never-
theless be protected by law as 'migratory workers
without papers. 121
In subsequent years, his successor, President Lopez Portillo has been
equally firm in his demands for their protection. But, as dis~ussed
earlier, the demand that the United States protect the rights of people
who clandestinely enter it in violation of its laws and who,accordingly,
are forced into a sub rosa life style of constant fear of detection, is a
absurd on its face. There is very little that can be done in any
realistic way to protect the rights of these helpless people. In fact,
the government of Mexico cannot even protect the illegal immigrants
from mistreatment by their fellow Mexican citizens. For they are often
exploited by Mexican citizens who serve as "coyotes" (i .e., smugglers),
or who sell counterfeit documents at exorbitant prices, and by the ever
present "mordida" (i .e., bribes and extortion payments) demands by local
Mexican border officials who sometimes arrange their exodus or prey upon
them when they return. Once in the United States, they are vulnerable
to other "coyotes", document counterfeiters, and "loan sharks" (i .e.,
people who make loans at exorbitant interest rates) as well as employers
who wish to exploit the total dependence of the illeg~l immigrants for
personal economic gain. Also, too often they fall victim to criminal
and violent elements both in the border towns and inland areas who subject
them to robbery, rape, torture, and even murder. Of course, United
States officials should try to stop all of these abuses but, in reality,
the very nature of the presence and the existence of illegal immigrants
makes it virtually impossible to prevent these actions. At best, all the
United States government can do is to react to the exploitation and the
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abuses after they have occurred. It can and should seek punishment where
civil and criminal acts can be documented. But even in these circum-
stances, it is difficult to take action if the illegal immigrants them-
selves do not report offences or are unwilling or unavailable to press
charges. The fact is that illegal immigration is a process that brings
to the surface the worst human elements in both Mexican and United States
societies. There is only one human rights position. It is to find ways
of stopping illegal entry before it takes place. Any other plea to human
rights is either patently naive or purely political rhetoric.
On the other hand, there are things the United States can do to
assist Mexico to reduce the outflow of its citizens and to demonstrate
both its sincerity and its understanding of Mexico's border problems.
The most important of these actions would be a drastic reduction in trade
barriers on Mexican exports. Mexico e~ports about 60 percent of its
total exports to the United States. It also imports about 62 percent of
its total imports from the United States. In addition, hundreds of
millions of dollars are paid to U.S. business firms each year in payment
for patent usages and profits on direct ~nvestments. The United States
has for many years run a trade surplus with Mexico eve~ when it has had
large deficits on a worldwide basis. A decrease in trade barriers would
enable the export industries in Mexico to expand and to absorb more
workers who might otherwise be tempted to become illegal immigrants. Of
course, there will be opposition by United States groups who will have to
compete with the increases in Mexican exports. Agricultural interests
. as well as many light manufacturers will be especially vulnerable and
they can be expected to raise forceful opposition. But if the free
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enterprise philosophy of the United States is to be more than simply
lip service, this enhanced competition should be encouraged.
Likewise, another step that will be equally controversial but which
is also essential to a comprehensive attack on illegal immigrati~n would
be efforts made by the United States to s top the export of ill ega 1
contraband into Mexico in violation of Mexico's import laws. Each year,
millions of dollars of goods are exported out of the United States to
Mexico through smuggling networks that are even more formally established
than those that smuggle illegal immigrants.
guns and cigarettes to TVsets and clothing.
The goods run the gamut from
If appeals to Mexico to en-
list its help to curtail the outflow of illegal immigrants are to be
taken seriously, similar requests by Mexico to stop the illegal flow of
United States goods into Mexico should be heeded.
VI. The Prospects for the Future
A realistic appraisal of the prospects for the 1980's is that
neither the governments of Mexico or the United States are likely to
take any meaningful steps to address the illegal immigration question.
Illegal immigration from Mexico and from other nations (especially the
Caribbean) to the United States will steadily increase .in numbers through-
out the decade. As they do, the related problems of jobs, housing,
accommodation of dependents, eligibility for social services, relations
with citizen workers, and human rights violations will mount.
The border communities of both nations can expect to bear the brunt
of all of these problems even more than they do now. The needs and
protections of their people will be ignored as in the past. But the
increased scale of all of the existing problems can be expected to foster
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even more hardship, violence, vice, and crime in the border communities
of both nations than is even presently the case. All of this will
attract much more publicity and lead to more academic studies and
government inquiries. But as the old saying goes, "after all is said
and done, more is said than done. II
The reasons for the gloomy prospects are simple. The socio-political
factors that are associated with migration issue are so complex that--when
combined with the economic considerations--they dictate that only a com-
prehensive approach could possibly offer hope for a solution. But a
comprehensive solution affects numerous groups. As such, it requires
support from many diverse quarters which, presently, does not exist.
Mexico and its leaders do not recognize the important changes that
the civil rights and the anti-poverty movements have had on politi.etal
and social policies of the United States since the 1960s. Instead, Mexico
looks backward to the historic relationships between the two nations. Mexico
does not understand the emerging internal priorities within the United
States that demand that economic opportunities must be provided for citizen
groups who in the past were either ignor~d or denied such chances. These
citizen workers are precisely the ones that shoulder the burden of competing
with illegal immigrants.
Likewise, there are fears among some Americans that the illegal immigrants
are themselves rapidly becoming a new group of economically and politically
disadvantaged persons. It is precisely because of the need to learn from
the past--not simply to replicate it into the future--that these people
want to stop illegal immigration. Otherwise, they fear there will be the
necessity of a new civil rights movement in the 1990s when the children of
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illegal immigrants react to the lives of oppression and fear experienced
by their parents and the denial of equal opportunity for themselves.
The United States, on the other hand, has always seen Mexico as a
series of symptoms and problems. The leaders of the United States simply
have never taken the time to understand Mexico or to attempt to develop
the foundation for a relationship of trust and concern between the two
nations. As the noted Mexican writer, Carlos Fuentes, recently observed
so clearly:
"What Lopez Portillo was trying to tell Carter during
his visit was: Please understand us as a civilization
and not as a series of agreements about tomatoes."22
Aside from the lack of perspective of American policy makers, there
is the fact that comprehensive solutions run counter to the American political
system. The fragmentation of congressional and executive branch decision-
making units of the federal government inhibits the ability to
address problems comprehensively. The only way to enact a comprehensive
policy,given the diversity of committees and agencies involved, is if
there is a strong coalition of supporters who are unified in their purpose.
This is definately not the present case in the United States. The migration
issue has divided all established coalitions and it has thrown usually
hostile groups into the same camps on both sides of the issue.23 At this
juncture, there is no indication that any of the new coalitions have been
able to develop the base of support needed to address the issue in a com-
prehensive way.
A resolution of the illegal immigration issue must begin with the
. determination by the governments of both nations to force changes internally
upon a multiple number of powerful groups who currently benefit from leaving
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things exactly as they are. Also, it requires that both nations achieve
a degree of understanding, respect, and cooperation that has never yet
existed between them. But, as a recent NewYork Times article so poignantly
observed:
Even the uncontrolled flow of unemployed Mexicans
crossing the border in search of work has provoked
little more than regional reactions. It took oil
~Mexico to penetrate the consciousness of Wash-
ington.
For the United States, then, Mexico is a new
issue. But for Mexico, the United States is an old
problem. Washington is, therefore, looking to the
future, while Mexico is remembering the past. And
more even than language, race, religion, culture
and politics, the two countries are separated by
history. It is not that Mexico cannot 'forgive'
the past; it is that for Mexicans, the past is
still present.24
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